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Abstract
The introduction of the WebRTC API to modern browsers has
brought about a new threat to user privacy. This API causes a range
of client IP addresses to become available to a visited website via
JavaScript even if a VPN is in use. This a potentially serious problem
for users utilizing VPN services for anonymity. In order to better un-
derstand the magnitude of this issue, we tested widely used browsers
and VPN services to discover which client IP addresses can be re-
vealed and in what circumstances. In most cases, at least one of the
client addresses is leaked. The number and type of leaked IP ad-
dresses are affected by the choices of browser and VPN service, mean-
ing that privacy-sensitive users should choose their browser and their
VPN provider with care. We conclude by proposing countermeasures
which can be used to help mitigate this issue.
1 Introduction
Ideally, when a user connects to the Internet via a Virtual Private Net-
work (VPN), the IP addresses (e.g. the public IP address) of the client device
are hidden from visited websites. If a user is using a VPN for anonymity rea-
sons, then revealing one, or more, of their IP addresses to a visited website
or any browser add-on that can execute JavaScript on the client’s browser
is likely to negate the purpose of VPN use. Revealing client IP address(es)
could enable tracking and/or identification of the client. Moreover, by using
geolocation lookup, a client’s public IP address could disclose its country
and city [6].
The introduction of WebRTC to modern web browsers has created a new
and simple method for a visited website to discover one or more of the client
IP addresses. WebRTC is a set of APIs and communications protocols that
provide browsers and mobile applications with Real-Time Communications
(RTC) capabilities1. Apparently, identifying one or more of the client IP
1https://webrtc.org [accessed on 14/05/2017]
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addresses via a feature of WebRTC was first reported and demonstrated by
Roesler2 in 2015. In this paper we refer to the WebRTC-based disclosure
of a client IP address to a visited website when using a VPN as a WebRTC
Leak.
The method due to Roesler can be used to reveal a number of client IP
addresses via JavaScript code executed on a WebRTC-supporting browser.
Private (or internal) IP address(es) (i.e. addresses only valid in a local sub-
network) can be extracted from the exchange of a Session Description Pro-
tocol (SDP) object, which is necessary to establish a P2P (peer-to-peer)
connection [4], while public (or external) IP address(es) (i.e. globally unique
addresses) can be retrieved by successfully pinging a STUN server. A STUN
server (i.e. a Session Traversal of User Datagram Protocol Through Network
Address Translators (NATs) server) allows a NAT client to set up interactive
communications, such as a phone call, to a VoIP provider hosted outside the
local network [4].
In this paper, we describe experiments performed to examine five types of
client IP address that could be revealed via the WebRTC functionality. We
also examined to what degree the choice of browser, VPN service and VPN
client-side configuration affects the number and type of leaked addresses. A
related investigation has been described by Perta et al. [8], who observed
the role of the VPN service in IP address leaks. However, they focused only
on IPv6 address leaks without looking at other types of IP address or the
role of the browser in the leaks. Moreover, the address leaks considered are
apparently not WebRTC-related. This is the first paper to examine all the
types of IP address that could leak, as well the first to consider the role of
the browser in these leaks.
It is important to note that WebRTC leaks could affect client privacy
even if a VPN is not in use. This is because the client private IP address
could be leaked, a piece of information which would not otherwise be avail-
able to a visited website even in the absence of a VPN. However, these
addresses are not necessarily very privacy-sensitive, since clients are typi-
cally assigned private IPv4 addresses in the 192.168.0.x range [1].
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we
discuss the types of IP address that could potentially be leaked via WebRTC.
We review prior work related to WebRTC leaks in section 3. The research
methodology employed as well as details of the experiments performed are
discussed in sections 4 and 5. In section 6, we report on and analyse the
results of these experiments. Before concluding in section 8, we discuss
WebRTC leak countermeasures in section 7.
2The report and the demonstration script can be found at https://diafygi.github.
io/webrtc-ips [accessed on 24/05/2017]
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2 IP Addresses At Risk
In the experiments (see Section 5) we found that WebRTC functionality
can be exploited to reveal one or more of five types of client IP address,
as listed below. Note that the public IPv4 address of a client is not in the
list, as in the experiments we performed we were never able to learn such
an address using WebRTC.
• Public IPv6 address: this is the IPv6 address of the platform and is
typically assigned by the ISP of the client.
• Public Temporary IPv6 address: this address is assigned by the net-
work to which the client platform is attached.
• Unique local address (ULA) assigned by LAN : this IPv6 address is
assigned by the network to which the client platform is attached, and is
the approximate IPv6 counterpart of the Private IPv4 address assigned
by LAN [3].
• Private IP address assigned by the VPN server : this private (IPv4 or
IPv6, depending on the VPN configuration) address is assigned by the
VPN server.
• Private IPv4 address assigned by LAN : this address is assigned by the
network to which the client platform is attached.
The disclosure of an IPv6 address is more privacy-damaging than that of
the private IPv4 address. Moreover, the Public IPv6 address remained the
same throughout more than two months of testing while the temporary IPv6
address changed with every connection instance. However, the persistence
of an IP address depends on the client and network configuration, but there
is no doubt that the public IPv6 address is more persistent than a temporary
IPv6 address (hence the name temporary).
More generally, the degree to which the disclosure of a particular type of
IP address degrades user privacy depends on its uniqueness and persistence.
For example, a private IPv4 address (4 bytes) is typically in the 192.168.0.x
range, and is thus far less privacy-sensitive than a public IPv6 address (16
bytes). Moreover, a leak of the IP addresses of clients that are assigned
static (i.e. fixed) IP addresses will be more privacy-compromising than if
these addresses are dynamically assigned (i.e. they change regularly).
3 Previous Work
WebRTC leaks have been discussed in several previous studies [1, 2, 4,
5, 7, 8]. Jakobsson [5] explores WebRTC leaks in the greatest depth, but
focuses only on public IP address leaks.
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Alaca et al. [1] observed that WebRTC features could enable a visited
website to learn the IP addresses assigned to all the network interfaces of
a client platform, including the private IP addresses assigned by a VPN.
They deemed this possibility to be a medium-level threat, which seems a
reasonable evaluation given they only observed the possibility of private IP
address leaks. However, they state in their evaluation that the WebRTC
leak issue requires further study.
Englehardt et al. [2] consider the WebRTC threat in some depth, but
like many other authors they only examine private IP address leaks. Liu et
al. [7] only examine leaking of private IP addresses. They also claim that
the WebRTC issue is only applicable to Chrome and Firefox, but it is not
clear what browsers and which versions they tested (the results we obtained,
described in Section 5, contradict this claim).
Hosoi et al. [4] point out that public IP addresses could be amongst those
leaked. As previously mentioned, Perta et al. [8] explore IPv6 address leaks
in detail. They report on the results of IP address leak tests of 14 VPN
services; however, they do not describe the role of WebRTC in these leaks.
A recent draft RFC, entitled WebRTC IP Address Handling Require-
ments [9], details browser mechanisms that can potentially prevent WebRTC-
related IP address leaks.
In summary, a number of authors have examined the WebRTC issue,
but none have made a comprehensive survey of the issue; typically they
have either only examined some of the possible IP addresses that can be
leaked, or not considered the roles of both the browser and the VPN service
in affecting the magnitude of the leaks. In the remainder of this paper we
describe the results of the first comprehensive study of the WebRTC leak
issue, including examining the roles of the browser, VPN service and VPN
configuration in affecting the nature and volume of IP addresses leaked.
This enables us to make recommendations to end users on how they might
optimise their behaviour to minimise their loss of privacy. We have also
provided a website which enables users to test the privacy properties of
their own current configurations.
4 Experimental Methodology
We used a modified version of Roesler’s publicly available JavaScript to
perform the experiments. The modification incorporates some of the fea-
tures provided by BrowserLeaks.com that enable the script to work with
Edge, which Roesler’s original script does not support. Preliminary tests
revealed that the number and type of leaked addresses are affected by the
choices for both the web browser and the VPN service. We therefore tested
five different widely used VPN services running on eight different browser-
OS combinations, namely four browsers each running on Windows and ma-
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cOS. Since we had no access to any publicly available information regarding
VPN services that are most widely used, we informally selected five of the
top search results in Google. The VPN services we chose to examine are:
Hide My A**! (HMA!), ZenMate, ExpressVPN, VyprVPN and TorGuard.
Full details of the OSs and VPNs used in the experiments can be found in
Appendix A.
For browsers, we chose to examine the five most widely used desktop
programs according to netmarketshare.com3, namely Chrome, Firefox,
Edge, Safari and Opera. Although Internet Explorer is the second most
widely used browser, we excluded it from the study because it does not
support WebRTC and so is not affected by the leaks discussed in this paper.
Moreover, it has been replaced by Edge as the default browser in Windows.
Since Chrome, Firefox and Opera are available on Windows and macOS, we
tested these three browsers on both OSs.
Most of the tested VPN programs provide means for the users to modify
some VPN configurations to, for example, switch from one VPN protocol
(e.g. L2TP) to another (e.g. PPTP). We found that in some cases this also
affects which IP addresses are leaked. This is likely to be due to the VPN
server configuration rather than the protocol itself. Nevertheless, this fact is
important to recognize and so we indicate in our results summary below the
VPN programs that exhibited such differences (see Appendix A for details
of tested VPN configurations).
5 Details of Experiments
To perform the experiments, a website (https://fingerprintable.
org/webrtcleaks) was specially established. The web page contains JavaScript
that, when executed in a client browser, fetches all the IP addresses it can
retrieve using WebRTC; the leaked IP addresses (if any) are then displayed
on the page (see Figure 1). When using it for the tests, the visiting device
used either the Windows ipconfig command at the command prompt, or
ifconfig in macOS terminal to identify the types of address displayed on the
page.
We deployed all five of the chosen VPN programs with each of the eight
selected browser-OS combinations, giving a total of 40 test cases. In each
case, we caused the client to visit the test page on the specially established
website, and documented the IP address(es) displayed. For each of the 40
(VPN, OS, browser) combinations, we visited the test page using all the
protocols/configurations supported by the VPN to detect any differences in
leaked IP addresses, i.e. for each of the 40 test cases we made between one
and five tests (for full details see Appendix B), giving a total of 116 tests.
3https://www.netmarketshare.com/browser-market-share.aspx [accessed on
14/05/2017]
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Figure 1: WebRTC leak detector
For example, for each browser-OS combination we visited the test page using
VyprVPN a number of times, one time using L2TP/IPsec once using PPTP,
and so on.
The tested VPN services provide access to VPN servers in a range of
countries. However, in a series of informal tests we found no difference in
the set of leaked IP addresses when connecting to VPN servers for the same
service in different countries.
6 Results and Analysis
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the experimental results for Windows and
macOS, respectively. Listed in the tables are the types of IP addresses
leaked in each test environment. The VPN protocols are also given in the
cases where the choice of protocol made a difference to the set of leaked IP
addresses. It is worth noting that tests on macOS while deploying VPN did
not reveal client private IPv4 address, public IPv6 address or ULA.
6.1 VPNs
The choice of VPN service had a significant effect on the number and
type of IP addresses leaked. In some cases, using one VPN protocol (e.g.
L2TP/IPsec) in a VPN program leaked a different number of addresses than
another protocol in the application. We observed no differences in address
leakage when switching between the TCP and UDP network protocols, in
VPN services that enabled such options for users. However, when testing
different VPN programs, variations in the sets of leaked IP addresses were
observed even when the same protocol was in use. We therefore concluded
that these differences can be attributed to how the VPN service is configured
to handle the connection when using particular protocols.
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As can be seen from the tables, TorGuard proved to be the least privacy-
compromising VPN service. In all test cases, it revealed none of the client’s
public IP addresses. At the other extreme, VyprVPN and ExpressVPN did
not prevent any of the WebRTC leaks.
Table 1: Results of experiments on Windows
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Edge Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4
IPv6
pvt. IPv4 pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
pvt. IPv4
IPv6
HMA! (all protocols) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4
pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
VPN IPv4
ZenMate VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4
pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (all protocols) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4
pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
VPN IPv4;
temp. IPv6
VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VyprVPN (L2TP/IPsec & PPTP) temp. IPv6 no leak pvt. IPv4
IPv6
ULA
temp. IPv6
TorGuard (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 pvt. IPv4
VPN IPv4
VPN IPv4
TorGuard (OpenConnect) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
IPv6 = public IPv6 address; temp. IPv6=public temporary IPv6 address; ULA =
unique local address; VPN IPv4 = private IP address assigned by VPN server; pvt.
IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by LAN.
6.2 Browsers
Safari revealed no IP addresses, and this is because its WebRTC-support
remains under development. This is clear from the Safari browser engine
(namely webkit) specifications status page4. By contrast, Edge revealed four
of the five IP addresses discussed in this paper (only the temporary IPv6
address was not leaked). Edge was the only browser to reveal the public
IPv6 address(es) and ULA(s). This makes it the most privacy-damaging
browser. This might be because at the present Edge is the only browser
that supports the next generation WebRTC API, named ORTC (Object
Real-Time Communications)5
Opera and Chrome were identical in terms of the number and type of
leaked addresses. This is likely because both are based on Google’s open-
source browser project, Chromium6. In all the individual tests that resulted
4https://webkit.org/status/ [accessed on 14/05/2017]
5https://ortc.org/faq [accessed 14/05/2017]
6 http://www.chromium.org/blink/developer-faq [accessed on 14/05/2017]
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in IP address leakage, they both revealed the temporary IPv6 address and
either the local private IP address or the VPN-assigned private IP address.
Somewhat different behaviour was exhibited by Firefox, which in most cases
revealed either the local private IP address or the VPN-assigned private IP
address; in some cases it did not reveal any addresses.
Firefox was the least privacy-damaging of the Windows-based browsers
and Edge the most. In macOS, Safari revealed no IP addresses and so it
is the least privacy-damaging. Chrome and Opera were the most privacy-
damaging macOS browsers.
Table 2: Results of experiments on macOS
VPN / Browser Chrome Firefox Safari Opera
Without VPN pvt. IPv4
IPv6
pvt. IPv4 no leak pvt. IPv4
IPv6
HMA! (PPTP) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
HMA! (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ZenMate VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (OpenVPN) VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6
ExpressVPN (L2TP/IPsec) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (Chameleon & OpenVPN) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
VyprVPN (L2TP/IPsec) no leak no leak no leak no leak
TorGuard (all protocols) VPN IPv4 VPN IPv4 no leak VPN IPv4
temp. IPv6=public temporary IPv6 address; VPN IPv4 = private IP address as-
signed by VPN server; pvt. IPv4 = private IPv4 address assigned by LAN.
7 Countermeasures
The main lesson from the experiments described in this paper is that
users concerned about IP address leaks should select their browser and
VPN service with care, perhaps using the https://fingerprintable.org/
webcrtleaks site to check the properties of the chosen combination. Over
and above this, users interested in maintaining their privacy by preventing
WebRTC leaks can perform one or more of the countermeasures discussed
below. In this context, the first countermeasure has previously been dis-
cussed by Hosoi et al. [4] and the second countermeasure by Perta et al.
[8].
It is worth noting that disabling JavaScript would prevent WebRTC
leaks but would also disable many features and functionality of modern
websites. Most users are likely to find this an unacceptably high cost for
the privacy enhancement they would receive, in the same way that whilst
disabling cookies has significant privacy benefits, the usability impact is too
great to make it a widely used protection measure.
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• Disable WebRTC Disabling WebRTC in a browser would prevent
all of the leaks discussed in this paper. Typically, this countermeasure
can be implemented via the browser user settings. However, such an
approach may not be acceptable to all users, since it will disable all
the functionality provided by WebRTC.
• Disable IPv6 Of course disabling IPv6 addressing in a client com-
puter means there are no IPv6 addresses (both regular and temporary)
or ULA to be leaked. Private IPv4 address(es) can still be leaked but
they are much less privacy-compromising than the other addresses.
• Anonymizing add-ons Browser add-ons are available that block
leakage of client addresses. For example, Chrome has an official add-on
called WebRTC Network Limiter7 that prevents WebRTC leaks. How-
ever, as stated in the add-on menu, using the add-on could negatively
affect WebRTC features.
• Browser choice As demonstrated in this paper the choice of browser
makes a significant difference to the type and number of leaked IP
addresses. A user can check their browser of choice by visiting the test
page to discover if IP addresses are leaked when using a VPN.
• VPN choice As demonstrated in this paper, WebRTC leaks also
depend on the VPN in use and its configuration. A user can test their
VPN of choice for WebRTC leaks to help decide whether or not it
meets their privacy needs. Again, this can be performed by visiting
the test web page and checking if any leaked IP addresses are displayed.
8 Summary and Conclusions
In the experiments performed in this study, Safari did not cause any
client IP addresses to be leaked via WebRTC leaks. Edge, on the other
hand, proved to be the most privacy-damaging in this respect. However,
regardless of the user browser choice, we found that some VPN implemen-
tations prevent leakage of client public IP address(es). Moreover, in some
cases, selecting an appropriate client VPN configuration fully or partially
prevented WebRTC leaks.
The experiments we performed in this study explored an aspect of We-
bRTC leaks that has not been addressed in previous work, namely that
the choice of browser and VPN service makes a significant difference to the
extend of WebRTC leaks. The results will help users decide on best prac-
tices to minimize the risk of WebRTC leaks. We also hope it will encourage
7https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/webrtc-network-limiter/
npeicpdbkakmehahjeeohfdhnlpdklia
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VPN and browser providers to work on mitigating the privacy-compromising
properties of their implementations of the WebRTC API.
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Appendices
A Program Versions
A.1 Operating Systems
The following OSs were used in the experiments.
• Windows 10.0.14393 (Build 14393)
• macOS 10.12.4 (16E195)
A.2 VPN Programs
The VPN program versions and URLs that were tested are listed below.
Table 3: VPN Program Versions
VPN / Specs Windows MacOS URL
HMA! 3.4.6.1 2.2.7.0 https://hidemyass.com
ZenMate 3.4.7.17 1.5.4 https://zenmate.com
ExpressVPN 6.0.9 6.3.3 https://expressvpn.com
VyprVPN 2.9.6.7227 2.14.0.5485 https://goldenfrog.com/vyprvpn
TorGuard 0.3.69 0.3.69 https://torguard.net
A.3 Browsers
Listed below are the names and versions of browsers used in the experi-
ments. The version numbers are the same on both Windows and MacOS.
• Chrome 58.0.3029.110
• Firefox 53.0.2
• Edge 38.14393.1066.0
• Opera 45.0.2552.635
• Safari 10.1 (12603.1.30.0.34)
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B Tested VPN Configurations
Table 4: Tested VPN program configurations
OS / VPN HMA! ZenMate ExpressVPN VyprVPN TorGuard
Windows OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
N/A OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
L2TP/IPsec
PPTP
SSTP
Chameleon*
OpenVPN
L2TP/IPsec
PPTP
OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
OpenConnect UDP
OpenConnect TCP
macOS OpenVPN
PPTP
N/A OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
L2TP/IPsec
Chameleon*
OpenVPN
L2TP/IPsec
OpenVPN UDP
OpenVPN TCP
OpenConnect UDP
OpenConnect TCP
*VyprVPN proprietary protocol
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